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Abstract
We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In
line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false
consensus e¤ect disappears if representative information is readily available. But the e¤ect
reappears if a small cognitive e¤ort is required to retrieve the information. Most subjects
apparently ignore valuable information if it is not handed to them on a silver platter. We
conclude that the relevance of the false consensus e¤ect depends on the di¢culty of the infor-
mation retrieval and that the underlying mechanism is an information processing de…ciency
rather than egocentricity. Moreover, we discuss the potential relevance of our …ndings for other
well-known e¤ects like the winner’s curse and overcon…dence.
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1 Introduction
Violations of the rationality postulates of economics, so-called choice anomalies, have received
substantial attention by economists (see Camerer, 1995), because they question the fundamental
tools of economic analysis. The relevance of anomalies for economic modeling, however, crucially
depends on how well they translate into economically relevant situations, hence how robust they
are to learning and to changes in institutions.
Friedman (1998) demonstrates that the so-called three-door anomaly can be constructed and
deconstructed by the use of di¤erent experimental conditions. He argues that alleged anomalies
“can be greatly diminished in appropriately structured learning environments” (p. 941) and that
economists should hence focus on “which learning environments encourage or discourage speci…c
kinds of anomalies . . . [and] . . . which institutions are sensitive to anomalous choice behavior”
(p.942).1 In the present paper we address this issue by way of an important example, the false
consensus e¤ect. We have demonstrated in Engelmann and Strobel (2000) that this e¤ect can
be made to disappear by a prominent presentation of representative information. In the present
study, we con…rm that this deconstruction works even in a one-shot setting. We also demonstrate
how the e¤ect can be reconstructed. It shows up clearly if the retrieval of this information requires
some e¤ort.
Considering the social psychology literature, the ‘false consensus e¤ect’, going back to Ross
et al. (1977), appears to be a well-established phenomenon. Indeed, already Mullen et al. (1985)
report 115 studies which show a false consensus e¤ect. Most of the studies employed a de…nition
similar to that used by Mullen et al. (1985):
1A discussion of the systematic construction and deconstruction of various choice anomalies is presented in
Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) and Gigerenzer (1991).
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False consensus refers to an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate consensus
for their own behaviors. Speci…cally, the false consensus hypothesis holds that people
who engage in a given behavior will estimate that behavior to be more common than
it is estimated to be by people who engage in alternative behaviors.2
In short, those people who choose A from a set of options {A, B} expect a higher frequency of A
choices than those who choose B. According to Dawes (1989, 1990), however, this type of de…nition
does not justify the label ‘false’. He argues that it is perfectly rational to use the information
about one’s own decision in the same way as the information about any other randomly selected
sample of size one. The e¤ect is only false if too much weight is assigned to one’s own decision.
We will therefore refer to the e¤ect de…ned above as a consensus e¤ect and use the following
de…nition of a false consensus e¤ect which is both stricter and more appropriate:
A (truly) false consensus e¤ect is considered to be present if people, when forming ex-
pectations concerning other people’s decisions, weight their own decision more heavily
than that of a randomly selected person from the same population.
Put di¤erently, people exhibit a false consensus e¤ect if among those with the same total infor-
mation (i.e. including the information about their own decision) the estimates are biased in the
direction of their own decision, i.e. those who choose behavior A expect a higher frequency of A
choices than those who choose B. In contrast to the traditional de…nition, this de…nition implies
that a false consensus e¤ect can be considered as a bias in a Bayesian framework. A consistent bias
2For example, in the study by Ross et al. subjects were asked to walk around campus wearing a sandwich board
saying “Repent”. Those who agreed estimated that 63.5% of their peers would do so, while those who refused
expected only 23.3% to agree.
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of expectations in the direction of a decision maker’s own decision or preferences would have an
impact on economic interaction whenever decisions are in‡uenced by these expectations, most no-
tably perhaps in …nancial markets (note the relation to overcon…dence, a similarly debated e¤ect,
that has received much more attention).3 Detecting conditions under which such a bias occurs as
well as quantifying the bias would greatly improve our ability to predict human behavior.
When the strict de…nition of the false consensus e¤ect is applied, results from social psychology
experiments are rather ambiguous.4 They usually do not allow for a straightforward test and some
aspects of the design appear problematic (see Dawes, 1990 and Engelmann and Strobel, 2000 for
a more detailed discussion). Studies by economists that were not designed to explicitly test for a
false consensus e¤ect appear to provide evidence in its favor, but usually based on the traditional,
inappropriate de…nition (e.g. Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Jacobsen and Sadrieh, 1996; Charness
and Grosskopf, 2001). Heijden et al. (2003) test for a consensus e¤ect in a survey experiment.
They …nd a clear consensus e¤ect, which, however, decreases signi…cantly if arguments concerning
the issue at hand and …nancial incentives are provided. Their design does not allow them to
conclude whether the consensus e¤ect is indeed a false consensus e¤ect.
Explicit tests for a false consensus e¤ect, run in accordance with the sacred principles of
experimental economics (i.e. no deception and clear …nancial incentives), are provided by O¤erman
et al. (1996) and by Engelmann and Strobel (2000). O¤erman et al. (1996) examine the presence of
a false consensus e¤ect in a public good experiment by comparing estimates given by participants
and observers and …nd no indication of a false consensus e¤ect. In Engelmann and Strobel (2000)
subjects make 16 simple binary choices (e.g. they decide whether they want to receive their
3Forsythe et al. (1992) …nd evidence for a (false) consensus e¤ect in a political stock market.
4For a recent critical account of the literature on the false consensus e¤ect see Krueger and Funder (2004).
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payment right after the experiment or one month later with 10% interest). In half of the cases,
they are then informed about the choices of four randomly selected subjects from the group of 16
taking part in each session, before they are asked to estimate the choice of the remaining eleven
subjects. We …nd that subjects attach a lower weight to their own choice than to the information
they are presented with in all …ve sessions, providing signi…cant evidence exactly contrary to a
false consensus e¤ect. On the other hand, we …nd signi…cant evidence for a consensus e¤ect, i.e.
subjects indeed consider their own choice as informative about others’ choices, but as less, not
more, informative than the choices of randomly selected other subjects.
A common feature of O¤erman et al. (1996) and Engelmann and Strobel (2000) is that the
available information is in a way handed to subjects on a silver platter. It is highly prominent
and requires absolutely no e¤ort on part of the subjects to retrieve. This is even more the case in
Engelmann and Strobel (2000) where we explicitly provide subjects with a list of others’ choices
than in O¤erman et al. (1996) where subjects observed the behavior in repeated games and
hence had to keep track of the aggregated data themselves.5 Hence the false consensus e¤ect can
easily be deconstructed by the provision of highly prominent representative information. This,
however, does not necessarily re‡ect the most realistic or relevant scenarios. In contrast, outside
the laboratory, one might often have to make a small cognitive e¤ort to …nd out about others’
choices. And in these cases people might rely more on their own choice as a guideline than
on available information because they either do not want to exert the e¤ort of retrieving the
information or such information is perceived as less relevant. The deconstruction might hence
5 In their design, however, an observer was linked with a speci…c participant making the choices of the participant
highly prominent for the observer. Thus while the information about other subjects is less prominent than in
Engelmann and Strobel (2000), the information that is crucial for their test is highly prominent as well.
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work under extreme conditions, but the e¤ect might still be relevant in other cases. The question
is how easily it can be reconstructed in the same framework where it has been deconstructed.
To investigate whether a false consensus e¤ect depends on the cognitive e¤ort needed to retrieve
information, we compare two treatments in a simple one-shot experiment. Subjects …rst choose
whether all four subjects in their group will play a lottery and then estimate how many of the
twelve subjects in the three other groups of the session have chosen the lottery. The treatments
di¤er in the form how information about the choice of the three other members of their own group
is provided before subjects state their estimate. In one treatment, the information is provided
explicitly. In the second treatment, information is only implicitly provided in the form of the
payo¤ of the lottery stage. This stage was designed, however, in a way that made the decisions
of the other three subjects easily retrievable from the payo¤, once a subject has realized that the
payo¤ conveys this information.
In a third treatment, subjects estimate the choice of the three other members of their group
before results from the lottery stage are provided, and then after having received detailed results
of the lottery stage they again estimate the choice of the remaining twelve subjects. The …rst esti-
mate replicates classical consensus experiments without provision of information, testing whether
subjects’ beliefs are biased towards their own choice in the absence of other information. Compar-
ing the second stage estimates in this treatment with those in the explicit information treatment
allows us to test whether beliefs are sticky, i.e. whether subjects’ beliefs are biased towards their
own choice even after they received con‡icting information if they expressed their beliefs before.
For all estimates substantial monetary incentives were provided. To the best of our knowledge
the present experiment is the …rst to systematically study the false consensus e¤ect under varying
information conditions.
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Our main hypothesis is that subjects make less use of implicit information than of explicit
information. Hence the estimates in the implicit information treatment should be more in line
with a false consensus e¤ect than in the explicit information treatment because subjects should rely
more on their own choice as benchmark in the former than in the latter. More speci…c hypotheses
are that estimates in the explicit information treatment run counter to a false consensus e¤ect,
whereas they are in line with a false consensus e¤ect in the implicit information treatment. Put
di¤erently, providing explicit information is su¢cient to deconstruct the e¤ect, while making the
information implicit su¢ces to reconstruct it.
Our results provide clear support for our hypotheses. In all but one of the groups in the
explicit information treatment results are in the opposite direction to a false consensus e¤ect, in
all groups in the implicit information treatment results are in line with a false consensus e¤ect.
This shows that most subjects are unwilling or unable to use information that is not handed
to them on a silver platter. It appears to us that in the implicit information treatment it does
not occur to many subjects that the other three subjects’ choices are valuable information and
that this information is rather easily available, while the prominent information in the explicit
information treatments is recognized as valuable information by virtually all subjects (or leads
them to unconsciously update their beliefs). In the third treatment, all subjects update their
beliefs as expected and beliefs are not sticky, because although …rst stage estimates are clearly
biased towards the subjects’ own choices, second stage estimates are not more biased towards
their own choices than in the explicit information treatment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the
experimental design. Section 3 contains the experimental results, followed by the conclusion.
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2 Experimental Design
The computerized experiments were run in the laboratory of experimental economics at the Uni-
versity of Bonn in November and December 2002. We used the tool kit z-Tree, developed by
Fischbacher (1999) for creating the experimental software and running the experiments. The
subject pool comprised 90 economics students, 14 law students, and 24 students of 20 other
disciplines.
We conducted three treatments: IM with information provided implicitly, EX with information
provided explicitly, and BA with estimates given both before and after the explicit provision of
information. In each of eight sessions (three in EX, three in IM, and two in BA), 16 subjects
participated.
Subjects gathered in a separate room next to the laboratory. After a short welcome they were
randomly placed at isolated computer terminals in the laboratory where they received written
instructions for the …rst stage of the experiment (for translated instructions see the Appendix).
The crucial issues were then summarized by the experimenter. Instructions for the second stage
of the experiment were provided on the computer screen after the …rst stage was completed.
The experiment consisted of only one period, divided into two stages. The 16 participants
were split into four groups of four, but the subjects did not know which of the other 15 subjects
were in their group.
Each subject started the experiment with an endowment of 10 Euro. In the …rst stage of
the experiment, subjects decided whether to conduct the following lottery. If they chose yes, 2
Euro were taken from each of the subjects in their group including themselves and then a prize
of 10 Euro was randomly allocated to one of them. For each subject who chose yes, a separate,
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# Lotteries Potential payo¤s
0 10
1 8, 18
2 6, 16, 26
3 4, 14, 24, 34
4 2, 12, 22, 32, 42
Table 1: Potential payo¤s dependent on the number of lotteries chosen in a group.
independent lottery was conducted. Table 1 shows the number of lottery choices in the group and
the resulting potential payo¤s.
If, for example, two subjects chose a lottery, payo¤s could be 6, 16, or 26 Euro, because two
times 2 Euro were taken away from the initial endowment resulting in 6 Euro, and either zero,
one, or two lotteries were won, adding 0, 10, or 20 Euro.6 Note that each choice of a lottery
increases the total payo¤ by 2 Euro to encourage subjects to choose the lottery (as will become
clear in a second, we wanted to maximize the probability of having both yes and no choices in
each group of four subjects).
We chose this game because it is relatively easy but not trivial to infer the other subjects’
choices from one’s own payo¤ after the …rst stage. While it may be di¢cult for subjects to realize
that their payo¤ conveys complete information about the other subjects’ choices (and we will
argue below that this is where subjects fail), once they have realized this, it is easy to derive
the information from the payo¤. For example, assume that a subject has chosen the lottery and
6To be precise, in this case where two lotteries were played, the payo¤s were either 16 for two subjects and 6 for
the other two, or 26 for one subject and 6 for the other three.
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Information
implicit explicit
estimates given after feedback only IM EX
estimates given both before and after feedback BA
Table 2: Overview of the Treatments
obtains a payo¤ of 16 Euro. Then this subject can infer that she has won a lottery and that two
lotteries have been played. Since she has chosen the lottery, exactly one other subject has chosen
the lottery as well. If a subject has not chosen the lottery and obtains a payo¤ of 24 he can infer
that he has won two lotteries, that three lotteries have been conducted and that hence all other
subjects have chosen the lottery.
Another reason we chose this game is that there is no obvious fair or unfair choice in the game
so that we can preclude that social norms bias the results towards conformity (i.e. that a subject
would choose the lottery when she expects other subjects to do so because she considers it fair,
as would be the case in, e.g., public good games).
In treatments IM and EX, after making their choice subjects received feedback about the
results of the …rst stage. In IM they only learned their payo¤ from the …rst period. In EX they
were given detailed feedback about the number of lottery choices in the …rst stage and how many
of these lotteries they had won. Treatment BA di¤ered from EX by …rst asking subjects about
their estimate for the number of lotteries chosen by the other three subjects in their group. For
an exactly correct guess they received 5 Euro.
In the second stage of the experiment, the task was to estimate how many lotteries the twelve
subjects in the other three groups of the present session had chosen. For an exactly correct guess
a subject received 15 Euro, certainly enough to encourage a subject to think hard and not to
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ignore potentially relevant information. This stage was identical in all treatments. See Table 2
for an overview of the treatments.
After having received feedback about the correct guess and their payo¤, subjects were asked to
…ll in a short questionnaire. Eventually they were called upon one by one to receive their payment
in a separate room. The sessions took between 40 and 50 minutes altogether. Average earnings
were 13.88 Euro.
3 Experimental Results
All four subjects in one group have the same information after receiving the feedback from the
…rst stage. If each subject considers his or her own choice to be equally informative as the choices
of the other three subjects (which appears to be rational) then there should be no systematic
di¤erence between the estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and by those who did
not. In contrast, the false consensus hypothesis states that subjects will consider their own choice
to be more informative than the information about the other subjects in their group. This would
imply that the subjects who chose the lottery will estimate a higher number of lottery choices
among the twelve remaining subjects than the subjects who did not choose the lottery. Hence
we can say that estimates in a group of four subjects correspond to a false consensus e¤ect if
the di¤erence between the average estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery and the
average estimate given by the subjects who did not choose the lottery is positive.7 This measure is
not de…ned for homogeneous groups where all subjects make the same choice. This is why we tried
7We cannot tell whether the subjects who chose the lottery, or those who did not, or both, exhibit a false
consensus e¤ect in this case, because we do not know their prior beliefs and hence do not know the result of correct
Bayesian updating for the information given, but it is clear that at least one side does.
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to choose experimental parameters that would provide roughly equal probabilities of choices for
and against the lottery in order to maximize the number of heterogeneous groups. (We actually
came relatively close to achieving this goal, the overall rate of choices in favor of the lottery is
61%).
We now come to the main result for the explicit information treatment.
Result 1: In treatment EX, when forming beliefs, subjects weight their own choice signi…cantly
less than the information about other subjects’ choices (that is, they make too little use of the
knowledge of their own choice), opposite to the false consensus hypothesis. Hence prominent
information is su¢cient to deconstruct the false consensus e¤ect.
Immediate support for Result 1 is provided in Table 3, which shows the number of lotteries
chosen in each of the twelve groups in treatment EX, the average estimate given by subjects
who chose and who did not choose the lottery as well as the di¤erence between these estimates.
Unfortunately, in groups 10 and 12 there was one subject that had participated in a previous
session. There appear to be two ways to handle this problem. The …rst is to exclude those groups
completely from the analysis, the second is to exclude the repeat subjects in the computation of
average estimates in the respective groups (since the only thing a subject learns about another
subject is his or her choice in the …rst stage, there is not really a danger of a repeat subject
spoiling the group, so this procedure appears to be su¢cient). The …rst approach appears to be
the more careful one. It does, however, only make our results stronger, in a way rewarding us for
a mistake in the procedures. Hence we follow both approaches.
As Table 3 shows, there are nine heterogeneous groups and in only one of them (12) the result
is in line with a false consensus e¤ect, i.e. the average estimate of lottery choices given by the
subjects who chose the lottery is larger than the average estimate given by the subjects who did
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Group # lotteries chosen average estimate Yes average estimate No di¤erence Yes – No
1 4 11.25 n.a. n.a
2 3 8.33 9 -0.67
3 1 3 6.67 -3.67
4 3 8 9 -1
5 3 8.67 10 -1.33
6 1 0 5.33 -5.33
7 4 10.5 n.a n.a
8 3 8.67 10 -1.33
9 4 10.5 n.a. n.a.
10¤ 1 4 4.33 / 4 -0.33 / 0
11 3 8.67 10 -1.33
12¤ 1 6 4.67 / 4.5 1.33 / 1.5
Table 3: Results for treatment EX. The columns show from left to right the group number, the
number of lotteries chosen in that group, the average estimate (from a possible range of 0 to 12)
given by the subjects who chose the lottery, that given by subjects who did not, and the di¤erence
between these two estimates. If this di¤erence is positive it corresponds to a false consensus e¤ect.
Group numbers with an asterisk indicate groups with repeat subjects. The second number in the
fourth and …fth columns for these groups indicates the estimates and di¤erences if these subjects
are excluded.
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not. In seven of them the e¤ect is in the opposite direction, and in the last (10) there is a tie (if
we include the repeat subject, the di¤erence is negative as well).8
Since di¤erent groups in one session do not interact, we can treat each group of four as a
statistically independent observation (more precisely, the aggregate measure we use in each group
is the di¤erence between the average estimates given by those who chose the lottery and by
those who did not). A Wilcoxon signed rank test (for the H0 hypothesis that the estimates are
equal) reveals that the tendency against a false consensus e¤ect is signi…cant at the 10% level
(p = 0:074; two-sided; hence for a one-sided test, which can be argued is appropriate for our
directed hypothesis, the di¤erence is signi…cant at the 5% level).9 Since the groups with the
repeat subjects are those with a positive di¤erence and a tie, the results are even clearer if we
exclude these groups altogether (p = 0:017).10
Hence our treatment EX replicates, as expected, our results from Engelmann and Strobel
(2000): subjects, when making estimates, give signi…cantly more weight to information provided
about other subjects’ choices than to their own choice, if that information is prominent and
available without any e¤ort. In other words we have successfully deconstructed a belief anomaly.
A natural question is whether the anomaly can be reconstructed by making the information
retrieval more di¢cult. This question is answered by our implicit information treatment.
Result 2: In treatment IM, when forming beliefs, subjects weight their own choice signi…cantly
more than the information about other subjects’ choices, in line with the false consensus hypothesis.
Hence making information less prominent is su¢cient to reconstruct the false consensus e¤ect.
8None of the results we report changes if we replace average estimates with median estimates.
9All tests are two-sided unless noted di¤erently.
10 Ignoring the problem of repeat subjects would also yield a stronger result (p = 0:042): Simple sign tests yield
very similar p-values.
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Table 4 shows the results for the twelve groups in treatment IM, with a structure identical to
Table 3. The results are even clearer than in treatment EX. There are ten heterogeneous groups
and in each of them the average estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery is higher
than the other subjects’ average estimate, in line with a false consensus e¤ect. Furthermore, in
six of the ten groups the di¤erence is substantial (> 3; corresponding to more than 25% of the
target group of twelve subjects).
A Wilcoxon signed rank test reveals that this tendency in line with a false consensus e¤ect is
signi…cant at the 1% level (p = 0:005; two-sided). Hence this treatment con…rms our hypothesis
that subjects exhibit a false consensus e¤ect if representative information is only implicitly pro-
vided. The extent of the di¤erence between treatments EX and IM suggests that most subjects in
IM simply do not come up with the idea of using the available information. The lower prominence
of the available information in treatment IM is su¢cient to reconstruct the false consensus e¤ect.
Since we …nd a signi…cant false consensus e¤ect in treatment IM and a signi…cant e¤ect opposite
to a false consensus in treatment EX, this already provides very strong support for our more modest
main hypothesis that results in treatment IM are closer to a false consensus e¤ect than results in
treatment EX. For the sake of completeness, we provide the result of a Mann-Whitney test of the
H0 hypothesis that the di¤erences between estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and
those who did not are not di¤erent in the two treatments. We can reject this H0 hypothesis at
the 0.1% level (p = 0:0004 if we exclude the repeat subjects, p = 0:0006 if we exclude the groups
with repeat subjects). Thus already with a moderate number of independent observations we …nd
very strong support for our main hypothesis.
Treatment BA provides further insights into the use of information. This treatment only
di¤ers from EX by the additional estimate subjects are asked to give before they get feedback on
15
Group # lotteries chosen average estimate Yes average estimate No di¤erence Yes – No
1 1 7 5.33 1.67
2 1 12 5.33 6.67
3 3 7 5 2
4 1 12 6.33 5.67
5 1 8 3 5
6 4 10 n.a. n.a.
7 1 11 4.33 6.67
8 4 9.5 n.a. n.a.
9 2 8.5 4.5 4
10 2 7.5 6 1.5
11 2 9 5.5 3.5
12 2 6.5 6 0.5
Table 4: Results for treatment IM. The columns show from left to right the group number, the
number of lotteries chosen in that group, the average estimate given by the subjects who chose
the lottery, that given by subjects who did not, and the di¤erence between these two estimates.
If this di¤erence is positive it corresponds to a false consensus e¤ect.
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the results of the …rst stage. Table 5 shows the data in the same form as Tables 3 and 4, but
in addition shows in the third and fourth column the estimates given in the …rst stage by the
subjects who chose the lottery and those who did not and it shows in parentheses the estimates
given by individual subjects both in the …rst and in the second stage (in the same order).
Result 3: In treatment BA, …rst-stage estimates exhibit a clear consensus e¤ect, while second-
stage estimates do not di¤er from treatment EX. Hence beliefs are not sticky.
The …rst result we observe is that estimates given in the …rst stage by subjects who chose the
lottery are de…nitely higher than estimates given by subjects who did not. In particular, of 23
subjects who chose the lottery 21 expected that two or three of the remaining three subjects chose
the lottery as well, whereas of nine subjects who did not choose the lottery, six expected that
none or only one of the other three subjects did. In all of the six heterogenous groups the average
estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery is higher than that given by the other subjects.
This yields clear and signi…cant evidence in favor of a consensus e¤ect, corresponding to the
traditional, inappropriate, de…nition of a false consensus e¤ect (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:001).11
Hence we replicate the results of classical results on the (false) consensus e¤ect. This implies that
the deconstruction of the false consensus e¤ect in treatment EX is indeed due to the availability
of prominent information (and the appropriate de…nition of the e¤ect) and not to other aspects of
our design that deviate from most studies in psychology, as for example, the monetary incentives
we provide.
The second result of treatment BA is that the estimates given after the distribution of infor-
mation di¤er again in the direction opposite to a false consensus e¤ect, i.e. the average estimates
11Note that we can apply the test to the individual …rst-stage decisions because they are independent. But even if
we use the di¤erences of average estimates in each group as in the other tests, the result is still signi…cant (Wilcoxon
signed rank test, p = 0:027).
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Group # lott. 1st est. Yes 1st est. No Yes – No 2nd est. Yes 2nd est. No Yes – No
1 3 2.33 (3,2,2) 2 (2) 0.33 8.67 (9,9,8) 10 (10) -1.33
2 1 2 (2) 1 (2,1,0) 1 1 (1) 3.67 (5,3,3) -2.67
3 3 2.33 (2,3,2) 1 (1) 1.33 7.67 (7,8,8) 10 (10) -2.33
4 3 2.33 (3,2,2) 1 (1) 1.33 9.33 (9,10,9) 11 (11) -1.67
5 2 2.5 (2,3) 1 (1,1) 1.5 7 (7,7) 5 (5,5) 2
6 3 2.33 (2,3,2) 2 (2) 0.33 8 (8,8,8) 9 (9) -1
7 4 1.75 (1,2,2,2) n.a. n.a. 10.25 (9,11,10,11) n.a. n.a.
8 4 2.25 (1,3,3,2) n.a. n.a. 10.25 (12,8,12,9) n.a. n.a.
Table 5: Results for treatment BA. The columns show from left to right the group number, the
number of lotteries chosen in that group, the …rst-stage average (and individual) estimates given
by the subjects who chose the lottery, the …rst-stage average (and individual) estimates given by
subjects who did not, and the di¤erence between these two estimates. If this di¤erence is positive
it corresponds to a consensus e¤ect. The remaining three columns show the corrsponding data
for second-stage estimates. A positive di¤erence here corresponds to a false consensus e¤ect.
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given by subjects who chose the lottery are lower than those given by the other subjects in …ve
of the six groups. This di¤erence fails to be signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0:173):
If, however, we consider treatments EX and BA together (which appears appropriate, because in
both treatments subjects had the same information presented in similar prominent ways after the
…rst stage), the second stage estimates indeed are signi…cantly di¤erent (Wilcoxon signed rank
test, p = 0:025; where we again excluded in EX the repeat subjects from the averages). This
supports previous experimental research that with readily available representative information,
subjects do not exhibit a false consensus e¤ect, but just the opposite: they give more weight to
this information than to their own choice.12 The new aspect we learn from treatment BA is that
this result is not changed if subjects are already asked for an estimate before they receive the
information, although they clearly show a consensus e¤ect at that stage. Hence subjects are not
reluctant to update their beliefs substantially as a result of new information.13
Indeed it is very informative to study the updating of individual subjects’ beliefs. Since in the
…rst stage subjects estimate how many of three others chose a lottery and in the second stage how
many of 12 did so, a simple projection of the …rst to the second estimate would imply multiplying
the …rst estimate by four. We can hence say that a subject updates his or her belief downwards if
the second stage estimate is smaller than four times the …rst stage estimate, updates it upwards if
12Considering EX and BA jointly as treatments with explicit information we can, of course, again reject the H0
hypothesis that the di¤erences between estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and by those who did not
are not di¤erent in treatments with explicit information and in treatments with implicit information (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0:0001).
13The di¤erences between estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and by subjects who did not, are far
from signi…cantly di¤erent between EX and BA (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:721); and in fact the tiny di¤erence is in
the direction of even less false consensus in BA, inconsistent with a hypothesis of stickiness of beliefs.
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the second stage estimate is larger than four times the …rst stage estimate and does not update if
the second stage estimate is exactly four times the …rst stage estimate. We would expect a subject
to update downwards if the …rst stage estimate was too high and to update upwards if it was too
low.
We …nd that updating is always in the correct direction. All eight subjects whose …rst stage
estimate was too high update downwards, all 13 whose …rst stage estimate was too low update
upwards and of the 11 who were correct, …ve do not update, while three updated upwards and
three downwards. See Figure 1 which illustrates how the error in the …rst stage is negatively
correlated with the updating of estimates from the …rst to the second stage.
Of course, part of this result is driven by a regression to the mean, because naturally it
was above-average estimates that were too high and below-average estimates that were too low.
However, more than half of the subjects, 17 out of 32, gave a …rst stage estimate of 2 and hence if
we restrict the analysis to this subset, results are not driven by a regression to the mean. Of these
17 subjects, for three this estimate turned out to be too high and they all updated downwards, for
six it was too low and they all updated upwards, and of the eight who were correct, three updated
upwards and one downwards.14 Thus overall subjects clearly adapt their beliefs in line with new
information, even if they had to express their beliefs before.
Glancing over the results for treatment IM, one might wonder whether subjects take the
information into account at all. An ANOVA test for the hypothesis that the average estimate
14For subjects who stated extreme estimates, updating upwards or downwards can also result from rounding. For
example, if the mode of the belief was at 90%, a subject would guess 3 in the …rst stage, but 11, and not 12, in the
second stage, and hence be considered to update downwards. This bias in favour of the observation that subjects
always update in the right direction does not, however, apply to the 17 subjects who stated an estimate of 2 in the
…rst stage.
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in the group is independent of the total information (conducted separately for the subjects who
chose the lottery and those who did not) reveals a level of signi…cance p > 0:27 for the subjects
who chose the lottery and p > 0:67 for the subjects who did not choose the lottery. Hence the
information has no clearly discernible impact on the estimates. In contrast, in EX the estimates
depend on the information at p < 0:001 both for subjects who chose the lottery and for those who
did not and in BA the levels of signi…cance are p < 0:002 for the subjects who chose the lottery
and p < 0:01 for those who did not. Hence if information is explicitly given it clearly in‡uences
the estimates. We summarize this in the following result.
Result 4: Explicit information has a signi…cant impact on estimates, while implicit informa-
tion has not.
Our main results are also supported by linear regressions where we regress the estimate given
by a subject in the second stage on the total number of lotteries chosen in his or her group and
his or her own choice. In IM the e¤ect of the total number of lotteries in the group is positive but
far from signi…cantly so (p > 0:5), while the e¤ect of the subject’s own choice is highly signi…cant
and positive (p < 0:001), in line with the false consensus hypothesis. In contrast, in EX and BA
the e¤ect of the total number of lottery choices is highly signi…cantly positive (p < 0:001), but the
e¤ect of the subject’s own choice is signi…cantly negative (p < 0:05 in EX and p < 0:1 in BA). This
implies that given the same total information, subjects who chose the lottery give a lower estimate,
opposite to the false consensus hypothesis. Note that this negative weight does not imply that
the subjects exhibit a false uniqueness e¤ect, i.e. assume that other subjects are di¤erent from
them. This would be the case if their own choice had a negative weight when conditioning on the
information about the other subjects. Doing this, however, the e¤ect of a subject’s own choice is
signi…cantly positive (p < 0:1 in EX and p < 0:01 in BA), hence in both treatments subjects also
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base their decision on their own choice.15
In post-experimental questionnaires, there is interestingly not a dramatic di¤erence in the
number of subjects who explicitly mention that they used the number of lottery choices in their
group as an input for their estimate (17 out of 48 in EX, 11 out of 48 in IM, and 7 out of 32
in BA). Apparently the number of subjects who are completely aware of the fact that this is a
rational way to proceed does not di¤er substantially between the treatments. The number of
those, however, who use the information but do not consider this crucial enough to mention it,
and possibly the number of those who are not even aware that the information in‡uences their
beliefs, appears to be much higher with explicit information. One might infer that the beliefs of a
substantial share of subjects are in‡uenced by explicit information without a conscious updating
process, but that their beliefs obviously cannot be in‡uenced by implicit information in the same
way because this requires a conscious information retrieval. Since the questionnaires consisted
only of an open question how subjects made their choices, we can only speculate how those who
did not mention that they used the information conceived their estimates.
While we cannot preclude with certainty that subjects in treatment IM tried to infer the choices
of the other subjects in their group but just made mistakes, we have at least indirect support that
they rather failed to realize that they can infer this information and that it might be useful. Since
it is more di¢cult to derive the information in treatment IM than to just read it in treatment
15We also ran regressions including the number of lotteries that a subject had won. While this would not be a
rational reaction, one might suspect that winning a lottery makes it appear more attractive and hence increases
the probability that one would choose the lottery in the future and hence by a misguided projection leads to an
increase in the subjective probability that others would choose the lottery. Contrary to this hypothesis, the number
of lotteries a subject has won has a negative e¤ect, though far from signi…cantly so in all treatments (p > 0:5).
Including this variable does not change any of the other results.
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EX, subjects who try to infer the information in treatment IM should take more time in the
second stage of the experiment than in treatment EX. We …nd the opposite. The average decision
time in the second stage is 59 seconds in treatment IM, but 77 seconds in treatment EX and 101
seconds in treatment BA. According to a Mann-Whitney test using group averages as independent
observations, the di¤erence in decision times is signi…cant between IM and EX (p < 0:03) and IM
and BA (p < 0:001) but only marginally signi…cant between EX and BA (0:06 < p < 0:07). While
the longer decision time in EX (and in particular in BA) can be attributed to the more extensive
feedback, the di¤erences in decision times gives us no reason to believe that subjects in IM tried
hard to infer the other subjects’ choices from their payo¤, but failed. Furthermore, among the
eleven subjects in IM who mentioned that they used the number of lottery choices in their own
group as an input for their estimate, ten derived this number correctly. They either stated this
number explicitly or the procedure they described and their estimate are only consistent with a
correct inference. Therefore, while errors in the process may have occurred, our data does not
indicate that they were frequent enough to drive the results.
A possible objection against our design is that it might be biased against a false consensus
e¤ect. If subjects’ preferred number of lotteries is not zero or four (e.g. when they like a high
maximal payo¤ but at the same time want to secure a minimal payo¤ of 4 Euros), they should
choose a lottery when they believe the others are not going to do so and vice versa, implying a
negative relation between their own choice and their estimate. Indeed, in the questionnaires a few
subjects expressed that they thought others would choose the lottery so they preferred not to do
so themselves. The strong consensus e¤ect we …nd in treatment BA, however, suggests that this
bias is not very important. Apparently most subjects either want lotteries or not, but they do not
prefer an intermediate number. Moreover, this makes the strong false consensus e¤ect we found
in treatment IM even more striking.
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A …nal and somewhat puzzling observation is that, although subjects in treatments EX and
BA make more use of the available information than in IM and do so in a rational manner, the
overall hit rate is higher in IM (10/48) than in EX (6/48) and BA(3/32). Even the average
deviation of the estimate from the correct number of lottery choices is lower in IM (2.71) than
in EX (3.08) and about the same as in BA (2.72).16 This suggests that subjects in the explicit
information treatments give too much weight to the information. On the other hand, use of the
information tends to reduce the probability of estimates that are wide of the mark, because the
variance of the deviations is lower in BA (3.95) and EX (5.54) than in IM (6.13).17
4 Concluding Remarks
We have presented an experiment investigating the dependence of a false consensus e¤ect on the
prominence of representative information. Subjects made a single choice whether or not to play a
lottery within their group of four subjects and in the second stage gave an estimate how many of
the twelve subjects in three other groups had chosen the lottery.
Our treatment EX where we give detailed feedback after the …rst stage con…rms the result
of previous studies (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000; O¤erman et al., 1996) that there is no false
consensus e¤ect if representative information is highly prominent and retrievable without any
16Heijden et al. (2003) …nd a similar puzzling e¤ect. The accuracy of the estimates in their experiment decreases
when …nancial incentives are provided.
17These results do not fundamentally change if we do not compare a subject’s estimate with what would have
been the correct estimate for that particular subject, but with the correct estimate averaged over all subjects in all
treatments who have the same information. This measure takes into account e¤ects due to the random composition
of sessions.
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e¤ort. Indeed, there is even a signi…cant e¤ect in the opposite direction, indicating that subjects
consider others’ choices as more informative than their own. While the information is highly
prominent in this treatment, it is less suggestive to use it when forming expectations than in
Engelmann and Strobel (2000). In that study there was no apparent purpose for the information
other than to be used as a guideline for the estimate, which was even highlighted by the repeated
switch between periods with and without information. In treatment EX the information about the
other subjects’ choices is well motivated by giving a more detailed explanation how the …rst-stage
payo¤s resulted, making it less apparent that the use of this information was the crucial question.
Hence the results from treatment EX are stronger than our previous ones.
In contrast, in our treatment IM where the information about other subjects’ choices can
only be retrieved from the payo¤ in the …rst-stage game, we …nd clear and signi…cant evidence
in favor of a false consensus e¤ect. In all groups estimates of the number of lotteries chosen by
the participants outside their own group are higher for subjects who chose the lottery themselves
than for those who did not. We conclude that the false consensus e¤ect can be deconstructed
by providing prominent representative information, and it can be reconstructed by reducing the
prominence of this information.
Treatment BA …nds a clear consensus e¤ect in the estimates given by subjects in the …rst
stage but again a clear e¤ect opposite to a false consensus e¤ect in the second stage after receiving
feedback on the …rst stage. This indicates that subjects do not feel bound by their …rst estimate
and are happy to update their beliefs if they receive con‡icting evidence. Indeed the updating
of beliefs after receiving information is always in the expected direction. The fact that we …nd a
clear consensus e¤ect without information but an equally strong e¤ect after receiving information
that runs counter to a false consensus e¤ect suggests that subjects consider themselves to some
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degree representative of the population but consider randomly sampled information to be more
representative. They appear to be thinking something like “others are like me, but others are
more like others than I am.”
Ex-post our results may appear not to be surprising. The extent of the treatment di¤erences is,
however, great and a claim that such a dramatic shift due to reduced prominence of the information
is exactly what should be expected appears to us as evidence of a hind-sight bias. The treatment
e¤ect is underlined by the rather substantial monetary incentives to provide a correct estimate
(15 Euro) and the fact that obtaining the information in treatment IM was relatively easy. To
be more precise, once a subject has realized that her own payo¤ provides herself with complete
information about all the choices in her group, infering this information is easy, while realizing
that the information is available is a more di¢cult task.18 It appears to us, indeed, that most
subjects simply do not come up with the idea at all that they can retrieve the other subjects’
choices from the …rst-stage outcome19 or that they do not realize that this information is valuable
if it is not explicitly provided.
The important implication is that we should not rely on subjects knowing (and using their
knowledge) what we know they can know. Even if knowing the game and the outcome is enough
to derive the other players’ choices, this does not mean subjects come up with the idea to work
18This is con…rmed by the observation that among the eleven subjects in IM who mentioned that they used the
number of lottery choices in their own group as an input for their estimate, ten derived this number correctly.
Furthermore, the analysis of decision times is not consistent with the hypothesis that the subjects in IM tried to
derive the information from the payo¤, but failed.
19Note that the instructions contained two examples how payo¤s depend on the number of lottery choices in the
group, which indicates that the reverse process is possible as well.
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backwards.20 In contrast, they may ignore valuable information and hence rely more on clues
like their own choice, giving rise to distortions of expectation like the false consensus e¤ect. Pre-
sentation of information can have dramatic impact. Highly prominent presentation can imply
that it dominates other valuable information. One might, for example, argue that in the explicit
information treatments information about the other subjects’ choices is, because it is new, more
prominent than the information about the subject’s own choice and thus explain the underweight-
ing of the latter. Implicit presentation of information, in contrast, can imply that it is widely
ignored.
The false consensus e¤ect, when it shows up, may in fact not be, as the psychology literature
suggests, an “egocentric bias”, but rather an “ignoring non-prominent information” bias, possibly
caused by what has been labeled the “availability heuristic”. This implies that the false consensus
e¤ect is not really about consensus. It is only an implication for speci…c questions (namely those
concerning consensus estimates). The underlying bias appears to be more fundamental, namely
on the level of de…cient processing of information that is not highly prominent, coupled with more
or less rational updating, given the limited information one is aware of. The e¤ect should hence
appropriately be called the “Oh, you have to tell me that something you said contains some useful
information” e¤ect. The ‡ip-side of this e¤ect seems to be the over-weighting of highly prominent
information.21
20As a consequence, in repeated games learning might depend crucially on whether players receive explicit or
implicit feedback about other players’ choices.
21This is what apparently happens in treatments EX and BA. The results we …nd in these should not be mistaken
for what can be called a false uniqueness e¤ect, i.e. the belief that others tend to be di¤erent than one’s self. Such
a belief would imply that subjects give negative weight to their own choice in the estimation. This is not what we
…nd, we only …nd that the weight given to their own choice is smaller than that given to the information about
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This e¤ect might also be partly responsible for other phenomena, for example the winner’s
curse. While a bidder’s own signal and the distribution of the value of the object to be auctioned
o¤ are usually highly prominent, the fact that winning the auction allows some conclusions about
the other bidder’s signals is not prominent. Or, put di¤erently, the information about a bidder’s
own signal is explicit, while that about the other bidders’ signals is only implicit. As most of the
subjects in our experiment apparently do not come up with the idea that their payo¤ from the
…rst stage conveys information about the behavior of the other subjects in their group, bidders
in a common value auction apparently tend to ignore that winning the auction implies an upper
bound on the signal of the other bidders.
Ignoring non-prominent information is also a potential cause for overcon…dence in …nancial
markets. While their private information is explicitly given and hence highly prominent to traders,
the representative information of other traders cannot be directly observed and is only implicitly
provided through the observation of the other traders’ choices (which, of course, requires correct
assumptions concerning their strategies). As a consequence traders rely too heavily on their own
information and behave as if they consider their own information as more accurate than the
others’.
One would naturally like to know how di¢cult it is to deconstruct this information processing
anomaly by, e.g., learning. Our experimental setup, however, does not allow for repetition (feed-
back across rounds would be more valuable than the information provided in any single round,
thus subjects should learn to essentially ignore the information) and hence other designs are nec-
essary. Other means of deconstruction might be substantially higher incentives or hints in the
instruction that non-prominence of information does not mean non-existence, i.e. that it pays to
others’ choices.
28
look for valuable information also under the silver platter. Slowing the decision process down, for
example by allowing subjects to enter the estimate only a few minutes after they were provided
with the feedback and asked the question, might also encourage them to search more intensely for
additional useful information.
Slembeck and Tyran (2004) demonstrate that the three-door anomaly can be almost completely
eliminated with repetition if the environment allows for communication or competition, factors
that might also reduce the ine¤ective processing of non-prominent information. Similarly, Palacios-
Huerta (2003) con…rm the results of Friedman (1998) that learning greatly diminishes the three-
door anomaly and …nds in addition that higher ability (measured primarily in terms of SAT scores
and GPA), larger incentives and communication between runs lead to faster learning.22
Our results concerning the false consensus e¤ect are well in line with results on other biases
and fallacies. For example, Koehler (1996) reviews the literature on the base rate fallacy and
suggests “that a base rate has its greatest impact in tasks that (a) are structured in ways that
sensitize decision-makers to the base rate, (b) are conceptualized by the decision-maker in relative
frequentist terms, (c) contain cues to base rate diagnosticity, and (d) invoke heuristics that focus
attention on the base rate.” In our experiments, parallels to points (a) and (d) appear to be at
work. Subjects are apparently more sensitive to the explicitly provided information in EX than
to the implicitly provided information in IM. The explicit information might also invoke simple
heuristics (e.g. simply multiplying the information about one’s own group by three). Krueger and
Funder (2004) criticize the focus of social psychological research on errors in decision making and
call for a balanced approach that investigates the conditions when biases occur and when they do
not. Our study provides just such an investigation for the false consensus e¤ect.
22 Interestingly, less able subjects pro…t more from social interaction, indicating that it leads to learning spillovers
from the more to the less able subjects.
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From a general perspective, the present experiment (in conjunction with our previous results
in Engelmann and Strobel, 2000) presents an example of how cognitive biases can be made to
disappear and reappear with the aid of variations in the design that might appear minor at a …rst
glance. Our results are in fact more striking than those of Friedman (1998) for the three-door
anomaly, because our experiment was one-shot and hence the alleged anomaly was not reduced
by learning, but disappeared completely just by presenting representative information in a highly
visible way. The anomaly could be made to reappear by making this information more di¢cult to
retrieve. Our interpretation of this reappearance is that the underlying mechanism of the anomaly
is not, as has been suggested, egocentricity, but a de…ciency in information processing.
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A Instructions
[This is a translated version of the experiment instructions. Paragraphs preceded by a treatment
speci…cation in square brackets are only given in the corresponding treatments.]
[Paper instructions, given to the subjects in the beginning of the experiment.]
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. Please, read these instructions thoroughly. If something remains
unclear to you or if you have a question later on, please raise your hand. We will then approach
you and solve the problem. Each of the participants in this experiment has received the same
instructions.
In this experiment you will earn an amount of money, which depends on your own decisions, the
decisions of the other participants and a random number generator. The earned amount of money
will be paid to you in cash straight after the experiment.
We will treat all your decisions as strictly con…dential. We will neither tell them to the other
participants nor to anybody else.
Please, stop communicating with other participants from now on. If you do not, the data of the
experiment will become useless to us, and we would have to exclude you from payment. Also,
please switch o¤ your mobile phone.
[Treatments EX and IM]
The experiment at hand consists of two parts. In the …rst part you have to make a decision which
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in‡uences your own payo¤ as well as the payo¤ of other participants. In the second part
we ask you for an estimation. In this part you can improve your own payo¤ only. Finally there
will be a questionnaire for statistical data. Detailed instructions for the …rst part you …nd below.
Further instructions you will get in due time on the screen.
[Treatment BA]
The experiment at hand consists of two parts. In the …rst part you have to make a decision which
in‡uences your own payo¤ as well as the payo¤ of other participants. Moreover we ask
you for an estimate. In the second part we again ask you for an estimation. In this part you
can improve your own payo¤ only. Finally there will be a questionnaire for statistical data.
Detailed instructions for the …rst part you …nd below. Further instructions you will get in due
time on the screen.
Part 1:
There are 16 persons in total taking part in this experiment. They are divided into groups of four.
Thus, you are in a group with three other participants. Neither you nor anybody else will get to
know the others’ identities. Each participant gets an initial endowment of 10 EURO.
Now, you can decide for or against a lottery. If you decide for the lottery, an amount of 2 EURO
is collected from each person in your group (including you). The collected total amount (4 times
2 EURO) will be raised to 10 EURO by the experimenters. This amount will be ra-ed to the
participants of your group, i.e. one randomly selected person receives the 10 EURO. Those who
had bad luck with the lottery receive nothing and also no compensation for the collected amount
of money.
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The other group members have to make the same decision. If, for example, all decide against the
lottery, then your payo¤ for Part 1 consists of your endowment of 10 EURO. If, for example, all
decide for a lottery, you take part in four lotteries. These lotteries are independent from each
other, one person can therefore win several lotteries. Your payo¤ for Part 1 would then consist of
2 EURO plus the possible gains from the four resulting lotteries.
[Treatment BA]
Furthermore we ask you to provide an estimation of how many of the other participants in your
group decided for the lottery and how many decided against. If your estimate exactly matches
the correct number then you will receive an extra bonus of 5 EURO.
Part 2:
You will receive the instructions for Part 2 in due time on the screen. In this part, each participant
is only able to improve their own payo¤.
End:
Thank you very much for your participation. Please answer the …nal questionnaire on the screen.
Please remain seated and stay quiet until we call you for payment.
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B Computer Screens
[In the following we report the content of the computer screens as they were presented to the
subjects. We report the screens of Treatment BA. For EX and IM subjects received a subset of
the information as we will explain with the corresponding screens. “??” is to be substituted by
the current information.]
[Screen 1. For Treatments EX and IM, the estimation part was missing.]
Your endowment amounts to 10 EURO. Please decide now whether you want to take part in a
lottery. If you opt for the lottery, the payo¤ of all four persons in your group will be decreased
by 2 EURO. In return a prize of 10 EURO is ra-ed to the four persons of your group.
Please, give now an estimation of how the 3 OTHER participants in your group decided. If you
exactly match the number you will get a bonus of 5 EURO.
Number of participants opted FOR the lottery
Number of participants opted AGAINST the lottery
No! No lottery Yes! Play lottery
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[Screen 2. For Treatment EX the last four lines of the upper box were missing. For Treatment
IM only the line starting with “After conducting the lotteries ...” was given in the upper box.]
You have decided against the lottery. From the other participants in your group 2 decided for
a lottery and 1 participant decided against a lottery. Thus there were two lotteries conducted
in your group. From these you have won 0 and receive 10 EURO for each of them.
After conducting the lotteries your payo¤ accounts to EURO ??
Your estimate of the number of lotteries chosen by others was ??
Your estimate deviates from the actual number by ??
Thus, you receive a bonus of EURO ??
Your total payo¤ from the …rst part of the experiment is EURO ??
Please, give now an estimation of how the 12 participants in the OTHER groups decided. If
you exactly match the number you will get a bonus of 15 EURO.
Number of participants opted FOR the lottery
Number of participants opted AGAINST the lottery
OK
37
[Screen 3]
Your estimate of the number of lotteries was ??
The actual number of lotteries in the other groups was ??
Your estimate deviates from the actual number by ??
Thus, you receive for the second part a bonus of EURO ??
Your total payo¤ accounts to EURO ??
OK
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Updating of Beliefs in Treatment BA
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Figure 1: Updating of estimates in treatment BA. The x-axis shows the di¤erence between a
subject’s estimate in the …rst stage and the true value, i.e. by how much the estimate was too
high. The y-axis shows the di¤erence between the second stage estimate and a simple projection
of the …rst stage estimate to the second stage task, which is achieved by multiplying the …rst stage
estimate by four. This is an estimate of the extent of updating. The size of a bubble shows how
often the corresponding combination occurred.
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